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Highlights 
 Stock markets react heterogeneously, and in quantile-specific patterns, to credit rating 
announcements. 
 More persistent and widespread effects are observed for PIIGS stock markets. 
 The effect of rating announcements is generally stronger and more widespread in the 
case of the volatility of returns. 
 The effect of the aggregate ratings is driven mostly by rating upgrades rather than 
downgrades. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides a novel perspective on the predictive ability of credit rating 
announcements over stock market returns and volatility using a novel methodology that 
formally distinguishes between different market states that can be characterized as bull, bear 
and normal market conditions. Using data on the credit rating announcements published by 
the three well-established credit rating agencies and data on BRICS and PIIGS stock markets, 
we show that the stock markets react heterogeneously, and in quantile-specific patterns, to 
rating announcements with more persistent and widespread effects observed for PIIGS stock 
markets. The effect of rating announcements is generally stronger and more widespread in 
the case of the volatility of returns, implying significant risk effects of these announcements. 
Finally, we show that the effect of the aggregate ratings is driven mostly by rating upgrades 
rather than downgrades, implying asymmetry in the predictive ability of rating 
announcements during good and bad times. Overall, our findings show that predictive 
models can be greatly enhanced by disaggregating the overall rating announcements and 
taking into account nonlinearity in the relationship between rating announcements and 
stock return dynamics.  
Keywords: Stock Markets Returns and Volatility; Credit Ratings; Nonparametric Quantile 
Causality; BRICS; PIIGS. 
JEL Codes: C22, G15.     
 
1. Introduction 
Numerous studies in the literature have examined the predictability of return and volatility 
dynamics in financial markets. A number of alternative predictors related to domestic and 
international financial, macroeconomic, institutional, behavioral, and financial/economic 
uncertainty have been used in both in- and out-of-sample tests (for detailed literature reviews, 
see Rapach et al., 2005; Rapach and Zhou 2013; Aye et al., 2017). Clearly, predictability of 
return and volatility is an important issue for practitioners as these statistics serve as basis 
for portfolio management and capital budgeting decisions. For academics, predictability of 
returns is a matter of market efficiency relating to the informational content of certain 
variables with predictive power that can be exploited to generate abnormal returns.  
The predictability of financial market movements often becomes more challenging 
with the existence of credit rating agencies (CRAs) who are tasked with the responsibility 
of assessing the credit quality of the sovereign nation or financial asset and make timely (or 
sometimes untimely) announcements about the confirmation or change of the rating. In 
Jo
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
oo
f
3 
practice, the rating announcements of the CRAs are often used by investors in their 
portfolio allocation and market timing decisions. Clearly, CRAs play a crucial role in 
broadening the financial market as the markets for structured products would not have 
developed unless the credit assessment of these products were performed and offered by the 
CRAs. For instance, of the total bond value outstanding, structured finance products 
accounted for 8.56% in 1985. This increased by nearly four times to 35.58% in December 
2008, before declining to 25.26% in December 2015.1 However, the global financial crisis of 
2008 has questioned the credibility of CRAs as they failed to correctly assess and disclose 
inherent asset specific risks, therefore, leaving the financial system hanging off the cliff. The 
report published by the financial stability forum in 2008 highlights the methodological 
shortcomings in risk assessment procedures employed by CRAs as well as conflicts of 
interests in the rating process as factors that led to the underestimation of the risks associated 
with the structured products.
2
  
Given the significant role played by the CRAs in providing sovereign credit 
assessment and the outlook on the local economic fundamentals and considering that CRAs 
played a vital role in the financial crisis, this paper applies a novel methodology developed 
by Balcilar et al. (2018) to examine the predictive ability of the credit rating announcements 
published by the three well-established credit rating agencies over stock market returns and 
volatility. The higher (kth)-order causality-in-quantiles approach of Balcilar et al. (2018) 
employed in the empirical analysis allows us to formally distinguish between normal, bull 
and bear market conditions as represented by the quantiles of the conditional distribution 
of returns and volatility, thus provide a more comprehensive insight to the effects of CRA 
announcements on stock market return dynamics.  
In our empirical analysis, we focus on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) and the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) economies as the 
former group represents major emerging markets, while the latter includes fragile developed 
markets. With the onset of the great financial crisis of 2007/2008, the U.S. government 
                                                          
1
 The aggregate structured finance and total bond outstanding balances were obtained from Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). The reports can be accessed at the following web link: 
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. 
2
 Also see Becker (2011) who notes that the credit rating agencies played a key role in the formation of the 
credit bubble that led to the collapse of financial system. 
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inevitably bailed out several financial institutions in order to avoid a destructive domino 
effect on the financial system. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
and the intensification of the financial crisis with its impact stretching as far as Europe, 
several EU states agreed to commit large resources to support financial institutions (Sgherri 
and Zoli, 2009, Gerlach, et al. 2010).
3
 It was around the same time when the sovereign spread 
across most member states also started to rise.
4
 To make things worse, on November 5
th
 
2009, Greece revealed its budget deficit at 12.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) which 
was over four times higher than the 3% “(convergence) criteria” set by the EU. This was 
coupled with the enormous debt burden for this country, amounting to 113% of GDP – 
nearly double the 60% of GDP “criteria” set by the EU. The list of heavily indebted 
countries that didn’t meet the “(convergence) criteria” also included Portugal, Italy and 
Spain, who saw their sovereign spreads over German Bunds to rise significantly following 
the first Greek bailout in May 2010. Doestz and Fischer (2010) note that the volatility in 
sovereign bond spread is indicative of a rise in market perception of default probability.  
In May 2010, José Manuel Barroso, the then President of the European 
Commission, harshly criticized the three main credit ratings agencies, noting that 
“deficiencies in their working methods have led to ratings being too cyclical, too reliant on 
the general market mood rather than on fundamentals – regardless of whether market mood 
is too optimistic or too pessimistic”, (Barroso, 2010). Against this background, given the 
significant volatility in spreads and increased probability of default for these five economies 
viz. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (also known as PIIGS) and the role CRA 
played before and around the onset of the great financial crisis as well as the EU sovereign 
debt crisis, we also include PIIGS in our empirical analysis. The comparative analysis of 
these two groups of countries allows us to determine whether these economies are 
equivalently sensitive to ratings announcements given the fact that PIIGS countries are 
backed by a major economic union (EU) and most BRICS countries are highly sensitive to 
commodity price fluctuations as they are either major exporters or importers of 
commodities. This comparison becomes particularly interesting considering that the BRICS 
                                                          
3
 See https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-111_en.htm for a comprehensive overview of national 
measures adopted as a response to the financial and economic crisis.  
4
 For instance, with the nationalization of Anglo Irish Bank in January 2009, the sovereign spread for Ireland 
skyrocketed from 30 basis points in March 2008 to 300 basis points in January 2009 (Mody and Sandri, 2011). 
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emerging economies displayed a significant resilience to the shocks from the financial crisis, 
while the developed economies in the PIIGS bloc failed to insulate themselves from the 
global recession. To that end, analyzing the degree of vulnerability to the shocks from the 
rating announcements of the CRAs can enlarge our understanding of the dynamics of the 
relationship between fragile advanced economies and emerging market economies as well as 
the role CRAs play as a driver of stock market dynamics. 
Our tests show that the relationship between ratings announcements and stock 
market dynamics is in fact highly nonlinear and quantile-specific for most countries. The 
stock markets are found to react heterogeneously to ratings announcements with more 
persistent and widespread effects observed for PIIGS stock markets, implying that being part 
of a large economic union does not lessen the impact of ratings changes on stock market 
dynamics. We also find that the effect of rating announcements is generally stronger and 
more widespread in the case of volatility of returns, implying significant risk effects of these 
announcements. Finally, additional tests show that the predictability of return and volatility 
via credit ratings is primarily driven by rating upgrades rather than downgrades. Overall, 
our findings show that predictive models can be greatly enhanced by disaggregating the 
overall rating announcements and taking into account nonlinearity in the relationship 
between ratings announcements and stock return dynamics. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature, Section 3 presents 
the quantile-based methodology, while Sections 4 and 5 discuss the data and empirical 
findings respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.     
2. Literature Review 
A number of studies in the literature have analyzed the effect of credit rating 
announcements of well-established CRAs on bond-yield spreads as well as stock market 
returns. The seminal study by Cantor and Packer (1996) investigates the predictive ability 
of rating announcements in explaining the cross-section of sovereign bond yields. They note 
that these announcements have immediate effects on market pricing for non-investment 
grade issues. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) examine the links between sovereign credit 
ratings and dollar bond yield spreads for a number of emerging markets and find that the 
CRAs have a significant effect on government bond yield spreads. Furthermore, they find 
that this effect is more pronounced when a country is put on review for a downgrade. 
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Brooks et al. (2004) examine the aggregate stock market impact of sovereign rating changes 
and find that, relative to rating upgrades, rating downgrades have a significant negative 
wealth impact on market returns. Pukthuanthong-Le et. al. (2007) later argue that the rating 
agencies provide financial markets with new tradable information and that changes in 
outlook significantly affect both bond and stock markets. More recently, Afonso et al. (2012) 
further support these findings and show that the changes in both credit rating notations and 
outlook have a significant effect on government bond yield spreads with the effect being 
more pronounced in the case of negative announcements.  
Another strand of the literature has looked at the cross-border contagion (spillover 
effect) of the sovereign rating announcements on the financial markets of the neighbouring 
countries. For instance, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) examine whether changes in 
ratings of assets from one country trigger contagious fluctuations in other countries and find 
that rating changes of bonds in one emerging market trigger shifts in both yield spreads and 
stock returns in other emerging economies. Gande and Parsley (2003) study the effect of a 
sovereign credit rating change of one country on the sovereign credit spreads of other 
countries and show that rating change in one country has a significant effect on sovereign 
credit spreads of other countries, implying spillover effects of rating changes. Using intraday 
market and sovereign ratings data for nine countries in Asia-Pacific region over the 1997-
2001 period, Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) find that currency and stock markets react 
somewhat heterogeneously to rating announcements with stock markets found to be more 
responsive to rating news than currency markets. From a different angle, Christopher et al. 
(2012) investigate the permanent and transitionary effects of sovereign credit ratings on time-
varying stock and bond market correlations with respective regional markets for nineteen 
emerging countries. They find that sovereign ratings and outlook announcements tend to 
be positively related to regional stock market co-movements, suggesting that there are 
positive rating spillover effects whereby rating upgrades provide obvious benefits for 
neighbouring countries in the region. All the above studies, however, have mainly relied on 
either the event study methodology, Granger causality, or vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology for their empirical analysis.  
Against this backdrop, we use the nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test recently 
proposed by Balcilar et al. (2018) to examine, for the first time, the predictability of returns 
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and volatility of the BRICS and the PIIGS based on credit ratings of the three main rating 
agencies, namely Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. We 
approach predictability from the perspective of causality, however, by focusing on quantile-
based predictability patterns, thus allowing us to relate the effects of CRA announcements 
to market conditions that can be characterized as bear, bull or normal markets. It must be 
noted that one could have also used nonlinear causality tests (for example, Heimstra and 
Jones (1994) and Diks and Panchenko (2005, 2006)) and GARCH type models to analyze 
the impact of credit ratings on returns and/or volatility. However, these approaches rely on 
conditional-mean based estimations, and hence fail to capture the entire conditional 
distribution of returns and volatility – something we can do with our approach. In the 
process, our test is a more general procedure to detect causality in both returns and volatility 
simultaneously at each quantile of their respective conditional distributions. Hence, we are 
able to capture existence or non-existence of causality at various market states, i.e. bear 
(lower quantiles), normal (median) and bull (upper quantiles), in these stock markets. To 
that end, being a more general test, our method is more likely to pick up causality when 
conditional mean-based tests might fail to do so.  Finally, since the model does not require 
the determination of the number of regimes as in a Markov-switching model, and can test 
for causality at each point of the conditional distribution characterizing specific regimes, our 
test also does not suffer from any misspecification in terms of  specifying and testing for the 
optimal number of regimes. 
3. Methodology 
This section provides a brief description of the quantile based methodology that we 
use to detect nonlinear causality via a hybrid approach developed by Balcilar et al. (2018) 
based on the frameworks of Nishiyama et al. (2011) and Jeong et al. (2012). The 
nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test combines elements of the test for nonlinear 
causality of k-th order developed by Nishiyama et al. (2011) with the causality-in-quantiles 
test developed by Jeong et al. (2012) and, hence, can be considered to be a generalization of 
the former. The causality-in-quantile approach has the following three novelties: Firstly, it 
is robust to misspecification errors as it detects the underlying dependence structure between 
the examined time series, which could prove to be particularly important as it is well known 
that stock returns display nonlinear dynamics (Caraiani, 2012) - a fact we show to hold in 
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our data as well. Secondly, via this methodology, we are able to test not only for causality-
in-mean (1st moment), but also for causality that may exist in the tails of the joint 
distribution of the variables. This is particularly important if the dependent variable has fat-
tails – something we show in our empirical analysis to exist for returns of the BRICS and 
PIIGS countries. Finally, we are also able to investigate causality-in-variance and, thus, study 
higher-order dependency. Such an investigation is important because, during some periods, 
causality in the conditional-mean may not exist while, at the same time, higher-order 
interdependencies may turn out to be significant. 
Let yt denote stock returns and xt denote the predictor variable, which in our case is 
the numerical value associated with a credit rating by a particular rating agency (as described 
in detail in the Data section).
5
 Formally, let  𝑌𝑡−1 ≡ (𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝), 𝑋𝑡−1 ≡ (𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝),  
𝑍𝑡 = (𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡), and 𝐹𝑦𝑡|∙(𝑦𝑡| •) denote the conditional distribution of 𝑦𝑡 given •.  Defining 
𝑄𝜃(𝑍𝑡−1) ≡ 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1)
 
and 𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) ≡ 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1), we have  𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑍𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} =
𝜃  with probability one. The (non)causality in the q -th quantile hypotheses to be tested are: 
𝐻0:   𝑃{𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} = 1                                                                                     (1)  
𝐻1:   𝑃{𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} < 1                                                                                      (2)  
Jeong et al. (2012) show that the feasible kernel-based test statistics has the following format: 
               𝐽𝑇 =
1
𝑇(𝑇 − 1)ℎ2𝑝
∑ ∑ 𝐾 (
𝑍𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝑠−1
ℎ
) 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂? 
𝑇
𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
                      
𝑇
𝑡=𝑝+1
                        (3) 
where 𝐾(•) is the kernel function with bandwidth ℎ, 𝑇 is the sample size, 𝑝 is the lag order, 
and 𝜀?̂? = 𝟏{𝑦𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)} − 𝜃 is the regression error, where ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) is an estimate of the 
𝜃-th conditional quantile and 𝟏{•} is the indicator function. The Nadarya-Watson kernel 
estimator of ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) is given by 
?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) =
∑ 𝐿 (
𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑠−1
ℎ )  𝟏{𝑦𝑠 ≤ 𝑦𝑡}
𝑇
𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
∑ 𝐿 (
𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑠−1
ℎ )
𝑇
𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
                                                                   (4)  
with 𝐿(•) denoting the kernel function.  
Balcilar et al. (2018) extend Jeong et al. (2012)'s framework, based on Nishiyama et 
al. (2011), to the second (or higher) moment which allows us to test the causality between 
                                                          
5 Note that the write-up of this section, due to the technical details, relies heavily on the discussion of the 
econometric methodology in Balcilar et al. (2018). 
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the credit rating and stock return volatility. In this case, the null and alternative hypotheses 
are given by: 
𝐻0:   𝑃 {𝐹𝑦𝑡𝑘|𝑍𝑡−1
{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} = 1,    𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                          (5)  
𝐻1:   𝑃 {𝐹𝑦𝑡𝑘|𝑍𝑡−1
{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} < 1,    𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                           (6)  
The causality-in-variance test can then be calculated by replacing 𝑦𝑡 in Eqs. (3) and 
(4) with 𝑦𝑡
2
. As pointed out by Balcilar et al. (2018), a rescaled version of 𝐽𝑇 has the standard 
normal distribution. Testing approach is sequential and failing to reject the test for 𝑘 =
1 does not automatically lead to no-causality in the second moment; one can still construct 
the test for 𝑘 = 2.  
The empirical implementation of causality testing via quantiles entails specifying three key 
parameters: the bandwidth (h), the lag order (p), and the kernel types for 𝐾(∙) and 𝐿(∙). We 
use a lag order of one based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). We determine ℎ 
by the leave-one-out least-squares cross validation. Finally, for 𝐾(∙) and  𝐿(∙), we use 
Gaussian kernels. 
 
4. Data 
We use daily data for Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) total return stock 
market indexes (in USD) for the BRICS and PIIGS countries over the period of 1992 to 
2016. Daily data are used in order to capture the dynamic, short-term effect of rating 
announcements on stock returns and volatility. CRA data includes the credit ratings by 
three agencies, namely Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. The 
data is sourced from Datastream maintained by Thomson Reuters. We work with returns, 
obtained as the first-differences of the natural logarithmic values of the indices expressed in 
percentage, while the squared values of returns are used to measure the volatility of returns.  
Sovereign credit ratings are measures used to assess the probability of default or 
creditworthiness of a national government, thus can be considered as an indicator of a 
government’s willingness and ability to pay its debt based on the terms it was issued. The 
most widely recognized international rating agencies, whose ratings we use in this study, 
include Fitch, Moody’s Investor Services (Moody’s), and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), as these 
agencies dominate almost the entirety of the market that can be classified as an oligopoly 
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(Blaurock, 2007). Each rating agency uses a different individual scale on its ratings scheme, 
but they do have vast similarities as well –a summary of the rating scales is provided in Table 
1(a). As shown in the table, the ratings are graded in an ordinal order based on various 
economic, social and political factors. The historical information on the ratings of a 
particular country by each of the three rating agencies is obtained from Bloomberg. 
We employ historical long-term sovereign ratings for foreign currency denominated debt 
to generate the independent variables to be used in our empirical analyses. Brooks et al. 
(2004) note that foreign currency ratings consistently have greater market impact on asset 
returns. In addition, these authors note that that while there is not a 100 percent 
correspondence between local or foreign currency ratings, a change in one still triggers a 
change in the other, 75 percent of the time. Similar to Cantor and Packer (1996), Gande and 
Parsley (2005), Ferreira and Gama (2007), Christopher et al. (2012) and Teixeira et al. (2018), 
we use a standard linear rating transformation to generate the time series of ratings for each 
country. Separate daily rating time series for a particular country is generated by assigning 
the appropriate numerical value of a particular rating on and after the day that it is 
implemented up until any subsequent revision is made. More specifically, along the lines of 
Teixeira et al. (2018), we assign a numerical value of 20 to prime-rated bonds and 0 to default 
as described in Table 1(b). 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for stock index returns (Table 2a) and for the 
numerical credit ratings from the three agencies (Table 2b). The table also notes the sample 
periods considered, with the start and end dates purely driven by data availability. Greece is 
the only country in the sample with negative mean return, most likely driven by the 
significant economic problems this country has faced over the past decade, while Russia has 
experienced the greatest return volatility as a major commodity exporter in the sample, 
thanks to the prolonged uncertainty experienced in the oil market, particularly following 
the global crisis. The negative mean return for Greece and high stock market volatility for 
Russia is accompanied with the widest range of credit ratings observed for these countries 
(Table 2b). For our context of causality-in-quantiles, all return series are found to be skewed 
to the left, with excess kurtosis, resulting in non-normal distributions, as indicated by the 
strong rejection of Jarque-Bera statistic at 1 percent level of significance. The heavy-tails of 
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the distributions of returns provide preliminary support for the use of the causality-in-
quantiles test in the empirical analysis. Figures 1 and 2 present the time series graphs for 
stock market returns and credit rating series, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 and FIGURES 1 AND 2] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Preliminary Tests 
Before we discuss the findings from the causality-in-quantiles tests, for the sake of 
completeness and comparability, we first provide the findings from the standard linear 
Granger causality test, with lag-lengths determined by the SIC. As shown in Table 3, barring 
the case of Greece under the credit ratings provided by Fitch, and S&P, the standard linear 
Granger causality tests yield no evidence of causality running from any of the credit ratings 
to the stock returns of the remaining BRICS and PIIGS countries at the conventional 5 
percent level of significance. Therefore, based on standard linear tests, one would incorrectly 
conclude no significant credit rating effects on the stock markets of these countries. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Given the insignificant results obtained from linear causality tests, we next formally 
examine the presence of nonlinearity in the relationship between the stock returns and the 
credit ratings of the three agencies. Nonlinearity, if present, would further motivate the use 
of the nonparametric quantile-in-causality approach as the quantile-based test would 
formally address nonlinearity in the relationship between stock returns and credit ratings. 
For this purpose, we apply the Brock et al., (1996, BDS) test on the residuals from the return 
equation involving lagged values of returns and that of the credit ratings, with the lags 
determined by the SIC. Table 4 presents the results of the BDS test of nonlinearity for the 
relationship between stock market returns and credit ratings. As shown in Table 4, we find 
strong evidence, at highest level of significance, for the rejection of the null of i.i.d. residuals 
at various embedded dimensions (m), providing strong evidence of nonlinearity in the 
relationship between returns and the three credit ratings. This evidence indicates that, the 
findings based on the linear Granger causality test, presented in Table 3, cannot be deemed 
robust and reliable. Given the strong evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between 
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returns and credit ratings, we now turn our attention to the causality-in-quantiles test, which 
is robust to linear misspecification due to its nonparametric (i.e., data-driven) approach. In 
addition, our approach also allows us to test whether the ratings capture predictive 
information over volatility in these stock markets. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
5.2 Quantile Causality Tests 
Table 5 presents the findings from the causality-in-quantiles tests for stock returns and 
volatility of the 10 stock markets emanating from the credit ratings of the three agencies. 
Quantiles that range between 0.1 and 0.9 are presented in columns with the findings for each 
of the three rating agencies presented in rows. Table 5a (5b) present the causality tests for 
stock market returns (volatility) with the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at 
5% level of significance indicated by the * symbol in each cell. The findings in both panels 
of Table 5 suggest that credit ratings indeed have a significant effect on stock market 
dynamics; however, the effect can be highly nonlinear and quantile-specific for some 
countries. In general, the effect of credit ratings is more prevalent on the volatility of returns 
with stronger and more consistent findings across different markets and quantiles, implying 
significant risk effects of the CRA announcements. The effect of ratings is also quite 
consistent across the three rating agencies examined, suggesting that the information 
reflected by rating announcements, irrespective of the source agency, are priced in the 
market, thus capturing new tradable information (Pukthuanthong-Le et. al., 2007).    
Examining PIIGS stock markets, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are found to be the most 
vulnerable economies to rating annoucements with significant causality observed across all 
quantiles of the conditional distribution of stock market returns and volatility. Observing 
consistent causal effects across all quantiles in the case of these countries reflect the economic 
vulnerability and debt issues these three fragile European nations have experienced over the 
past decade. In the case of Spain, however, the causality effect is limited to market volatility 
and mostly concentrated on the quantiles above the median, suggesting that rating 
announcements have contributed to higher market volatility in this market. Considering 
the findings in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Gande and Parsley (2003), it is possible 
that the volatility effect on the Spanish market reflects volatility spillover effects from rating 
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announcements for Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Interestingly, Italy stands out as the only 
country in the sample with no significant causality observed between rating announcements 
and stock market returns or volatility. This finding is consistent with Linciano (2004) who 
also reports moderate or statistically insignificant stock price reactions to rating change 
announcement for this country. In our case, the insignificant results may be due to relatively 
lower variation in the credit ratings for this country compared to the other PIIGS nations 
(Table 2b) which might have made it relatively easier for investors to build their expectations 
on rating changes.  
It can also be argued that the finding of non-causality in the case of Italy could be due to 
sigificant mispricing (undervaluation) in the Italian stock market relative to the average stock 
market valuation of the PIIGS economies. In fact, Italy’s stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of the GDP was 34.72% compared to the average valuation of nearly 50% for all 
the PIIGS economies. With this undervaluation, we conjecture that the stock market will 
remain relatively immune from the shocks of the ratings announcements, particularly when 
compared to markets that are significantly overvalued relative to the size of the economy. 
On the other hand, considering the government debt levels, one of the importatnt 
determinants of credit rating decisions (e.g. Reusens and Croux, 2017), one can expect the 
stock market of the country with significant debt levels to be more sensitive to sovereign 
rating announcements. Of all the PIIGS economies, we observe that Italy had the second 
highest government debt as a percentage of the GDP (i.e. the average government debt was 
121.22% of the GDP since the onset of the financial crisis).
6
 Our findings, therefore, suggest 
that despite the higher levels of the government debt and significant undervaluation, Italian 
stock market has remained relatively immune to shocks from the rating announcements. To 
that end, the findings point to the role of mispricing as a determinant of the market’s 
reaction to ratings announcements.  
In the case of the emerging BRICS nations, South Africa stands out as the most 
vulnerable nation with significant causality on both stock market return and volatility 
consistently across all quantiles. While causality on returns is generally weaker and/or 
quantile-specific for Russia, India and China, we observe that the effect of rating 
                                                          
6
 The average stock market capitalization as a percentage of the GDP and the average government debt as a 
percentage of the GDP are calculated using data from the World Bank Database.  
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announcements is more consistent on market volatility and particularly at quantiles above 
the median, implying risk effects of rating announcements in these stock markets. 
Interestingly, Brazil is found to be the least sensitive BRICS nation to rating announcements 
with the exception of Moody’s rating at several quantiles. It is possible that the market had 
already anticipated ratings announcements for this country long before the announcement, 
thus rendering our tests insignificant. Overall, the quantile-based tests provide novel insight 
that cannot be captured by the misspecified linear causality tests reported in Table 3 and 
suggest that credit ratings contain predictive value over return and volatility in most of the 
stock markets examined, while the predictive ability is concentrated more on market 
volatility. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5] 
5.3 Asymmetric Effect of Upgrades and Downgrades 
Having presented evidence of significant causality from credit ratings to stock market 
return dynamics, we next examine whether the predictive power of credit ratings is 
primarily driven by rating upgrades or downgrades. For this purpose, we create two dummy 
variables corresponding to an upgrade and downgrade such that the variable takes a value of 
1 if there is an upgrade (downgrade) and zero if there is a downgrade (upgrade) or if the 
rating remains unchanged. We then multiply the numerical rating values with the dummies 
to come up with the corresponding upgrade or downgrade in ratings. Tables 6 and 7 present 
the findings from quantile causality tests for ratings upgrades and downgrades, respectively. 
Panels a and b present the findings for stock market returns and volatility, respectively. 
Understandably, when there were no upgrades or downgrades for a particular country based 
on the ratings of a specific rating agency over the period under consideration, we do not 
have results for those cases.  
Consistent with the earlier findings for the overall ratings, we observe that the effect is 
generally more persistent on volatility than returns although significant causality is also 
observed in the case of returns. The insignificant results for Italy and Brazil still hold 
suggesting that the finding of non-causality is not driven by asymmetric effects of 
downgrades and upgrades. Examining the findings for rating upgrades and downgrades 
reported in Tables 6 and 7, we observe significant causal effects of credit ratings in both 
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cases. Interestingly, however, we see broader significance patterns in the case of rating 
upgrades in Table 6, compared to the findings for rating downgrades in Table 7. There are 
also instances when causality does not exist for the overall ratings (Table 5), but does under 
an upgrade for certain quantiles (e.g. Russia, China). The relatively stronger findings 
observed in the case of rating upgrades seem to contradict with several previous studies that 
report significant stock market reactions observed primarily in the case of rating downgrades 
(e.g. Hu et al, 2016; Li et al., 2006; Brooks et al. 2004).
7
 However, there is also evidence in 
the literature showing that the stock market reaction to rating upgrades as well as 
downgrades is significant, particularly since the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Jorion et al, 2005). This is also supported by the earlier finding in Hseuh and Liu (1992) of 
significant abnormal stock price movements in response to both bond rating downgrades 
and upgrades.  
Given the mixed evidence in the literature, one possible explanation for the stronger 
findings observed in the case of upgrades is that rating upgrades are generally harder to 
anticipate by market participants and includes a greater degree of surprise component 
compared to anticipated downgrade announcements, thus leading to stronger effects on 
stock market returns and volatility. On the other hand, when times are bad, it is easier for 
investors to anticipate a ratings downgrade which makes the effect on market dynamics 
more limited relative to an upgrade. Indeed, the literature suggests that short sellers are often 
able to successfully identify firms with credit rating downgrades (Henry et al., 2015) and 
that investors might use previous downgrades as an indication of a subsequent downgrade 
(e.g. Lando and Skodeberg, 2002). To that end, relatively weaker results observed in the case 
of rating downgrades is not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence in the literature and 
points to the information inefficiencies associated with the effect of downgrade 
announcements on stock market returns. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that there is 
value added in terms of predictability by disaggregating the overall rating announcements 
and analysts must take into account the asymmetric effects of upgrades and downgrades in 
forecasting exercises. 
 [INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7] 
                                                          
7 Also see, Norden and Weber (2004) who observe a significant abnormal performance in the expected direction 
around negative rating events, but insignificant market reactions around positive events. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a novel perspective to the predictive ability of credit rating 
announcements over stock market returns and volatility using a novel methodology that 
formally distinguishes between different market states that can be characterized as bull, bear 
and normal market conditions. Using data on the credit rating announcements published by 
the three well-established credit rating agencies (Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch Ratings) and employing the nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test of 
Balcilar et al. (2018), we examine, for the first time, the predictability of returns and volatility 
of the BRICS and the PIIGS stock markets based on the credit ratings announcements.  
While standard, linear causality tests yield largely insignificant results, our tests show 
that the relationship between ratings announcements and stock market dynamics is in fact 
highly nonlinear and quantile-specific for most countries. Quantile-based tests show that the 
major emerging markets (BRICS) and the fragile developed markets (PIIGS) react 
heterogeneously to ratings announcements. Interestingly, ratings announcements are found 
to have more widespread effects over PIIGS stock markets, implying that being part of a 
large economic union does not lessen the impact of ratings changes on stock market 
dynamics.  
Causality is generally found to be more prevalent and stronger on return volatility than 
returns and mostly concentrated on the quantiles above the median, suggesting that rating 
announcements contribute to higher market volatility, an issue policy makers should 
consider in order to mitigate the negative effects of these announcements on their stock 
markets. This is particularly the case for Portugal, Ireland and Greece that are found to be 
the most vulnerable PIIGS nations with significant causality observed across all quantiles of 
the conditional distribution of market returns and volatility. At the same time, Italy stands 
out as the only country in the sample with no significant causality observed, neither in the 
case of returns nor in the case of volatility. Similarly, South Africa stands out as the most 
vulnerable BRICS nation with significant causality observed on both stock market return 
and volatility consistently across all quantiles.  
Finally, additional tests show that predictability via credit ratings is primarily driven by 
rating upgrades rather than downgrades. We argue that rating upgrades are relatively harder 
to anticipate by market participants, leading to greater causal effects while, in bad times, 
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there is greater anticipation towards a downgrade, thus lessening the impact of a downgrade 
on stock market return dynamics. Overall, our findings show that predictive models can be 
greatly enhanced by disaggregating the overall rating announcements and taking into 
account nonlinearity in the relationship between ratings announcements and stock return 
dynamics. 
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Table 1(a): Rating scales of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
Moody’s S&P Fitch Description 
Aaa AAA AAA Prime 
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA+, AA, AA- AA+, AA, AA- High grade 
A1, A2, A3 A+, A, A- A+, A, A- Upper medium grade 
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB+, BBB, BBB- BBB+, BBB, BBB- Lower medium grade 
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB+, BB, BB- BB+, BB, BB- 
Non-
investment/speculative 
grade 
B1, B2, B3 B+, B, B- B+, B, B- Highly speculative 
Caa1, Caa2, Caa3 CCC+, CCC, 
CCC- 
CCC Extremely speculative 
Ca CC CC Imminent default 
C R, SD, D C, RD, D Default 
Source: Website of the three rating agencies. 
 
Table 1(b): Numerical conversion of the sovereign credit ratings. 
Rating Scale  
 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 
Moody’
s 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 
S&P AA
A 
AA
+ 
AA AA- A+ A A- BBB
+ 
BBB BBB- BB+ 
Fitch AA
A 
AA
+ 
AA AA- A+ A A- BBB
+ 
BBB BBB- BB+ 
Rating Scale 
 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Moody’
s 
Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 Ca C 
S&P BB BB- B+ B B- CCC
+ 
CC
C 
CCC- CC R, SD, D 
Fitch BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC C RD D 
Note: The rating provided by the three main rating agencies i.e., Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and 
Fitch is converted into a numerical scale from 0 (worst) to 20 (best). 
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Table 2a: Summary statistics and sample periods for stock market returns. 
Country Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median Min Max Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis Jarqu
e-
Bera 
Brazil  (31/12/1992 - 24/02/2016) 0.0002 0.024 0.0006 -0.183 0.167 -0.213 8.977 0.000* 
Russia (07/10/1996 to 22/04/2016) 0.0003 0.046 0.0003 -2.003 1.913 -2.129 1263.955 0.000* 
India (31/12/1992 to 08/04/2015) 0.0003 0.017 0.0002 -0.147 0.195 -0.154 10.286 0.000* 
China (26/07/1993 to 31/03/2016) 0.0002 0.019 0.0000 -0.143 0.157 0.117 9.428 0.000* 
South Africa (03/10/1994 to 
06/05/2016) 
0.0001 0.017 0.0005 -0.136 0.124 -0.361 8.321 0.000* 
Portugal (31/12/1992 to 18/09/2015) 0.0000 0.013 0.0001 -0.130 0.118 -0.151 9.437 0.000* 
Italy (31/12/1992 to 05/12/2014) 0.0001 0.016 0.0003 -0.109 0.125 -0.051 7.837 0.000* 
Ireland (31/12/1992 to 13/05/2016) 0.0001 0.016 0.0002 -0.189 0.136 -0.649 13.438 0.000* 
Greece (31/12/1992 to 22/01/2016) -0.0003 0.022 0.0000 -0.243 0.172 -0.263 10.601 0.000* 
Spain (31/12/1992 to 19/02/2016) 0.0002 0.016 0.0003 -0.112 0.160 0.038 9.348 0.000* 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of normality at 1% level of significance. 
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Table 2b: Summary statistics for credit rating series 
Country Rating Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median Min Max Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera p-
value 
Sample 
period 
Brazil 
S&P 9.003 1.899 8.000 6.0 12.0 0.243 1.526 0.000 30/11/1994 
to 
17/02/2016 
Moody’s 8.418 2.307 7.000 6.0 12.0 0.467 1.575 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
24/02/2016 
Fitch 8.102 1.654 8.000 6.0 12.0 0.678 2.172 0.000 01/12/1994 
to 
04/04/2011 
Russia 
S&P 9.213 3.920 11.000 0.0 13.0 -1.257 3.532 0.000 10/04/1996 
to 
26/01/2015 
Moody’s 10.310 2.774 11.000 5.0 13.0 -0.744 2.212 0.000 07/10/1996 
to 
22/04/2016 
Fitch 9.729 2.971 10.000 4.0 13.0 -0.731 2.224 0.000 07/10/1996 
to 
16/01/2012 
India 
S&P 10.063 0.798 10.000 9.0 11.0 -0.114 1.577 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
26/09/2014 
Moody’s 10.369 0.906 11.000 9.0 11.0 -0.794 1.692 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
08/04/2015 
Fitch 10.303 0.751 10.000 9.0 11.0 -0.561 1.965 0.000 08/03/2000 
to 
18/06/2012 
China 
S&P 14.101 2.058 13.000 12.0 17.0 0.325 1.413 0.000 26/07/1993 
to 
31/03/2016 
Moody’s 15.158 1.237 15.000 13.0 17.0 0.426 1.583 0.000 26/07/1993 
to 
02/03/2016 
Fitch 14.669 0.858 14.000 14.0 16.0 0.690 1.710 0.000 11/12/1997 
to 
12/04/2011 
South 
Africa 
S&P 11.451 1.285 11.000 9.0 13.0 -0.072 1.760 0.000 03/10/1994 
to 
04/12/2015 
Moody’s 12.272 1.076 12.000 11.0 14.0 0.159 1.701 0.000 03/10/1994 
to 
06/05/2016 
Fitch 11.208 1.699 12.000 9.0 13.0 -0.275 1.400 0.000 22/09/1994 
to 
13/01/2012 
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Table 2b (cont.d) 
Countr
y 
Rating Mean Std. 
dev. 
Media
n 
Min Max Skew
- 
ness 
Kurtosi
s 
Jarque
-Bera 
p-
value 
Sample 
period 
Portuga
l 
 
 
 
 
S&P 
15.596 3.209 17.000 9.0 18.0 -
1.351 
3.132 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
18/09/2015 
Moody’s 
16.050 3.309 18.000 8.0 18.0 -
1.757 
4.503 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
25/07/2014 
Fitch 
17.438 1.370 18.000 10.0 18.0 -
3.922 
18.554 0.000 10/08/1994 
to 
24/11/2011 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
S&P 
16.686 1.852 18.000 11.0 19.0 -
1.404 
3.881 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
05/12/2014 
Moody’s 
16.824 1.642 17.000 12.0 18.0 -
1.893 
5.947 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
14/02/2014 
Fitch 
17.261 0.480 17.000 14.0 18.0 0.518 2.927 0.000 10/08/1994 
to 
27/01/2012 
Ireland 
 
 
 
 
S&P 
17.793 2.422 18.000 13.0 20.0 -
0.992 
2.651 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
05/06/2015 
Moody’s 
17.452 3.515 19.000 10.0 20.0 -
1.189 
2.846 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
13/05/2016 
Fitch 
19.064 1.807 20.000 13.0 20.0 -
2.534 
8.566 0.000 10/10/1994 
to 
27/01/2012 
Greece 
 
 
 
 
S&P 
11.304 4.163 11.000 0.0 16.0 -
0.997 
2.988 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
22/01/2016 
Moody’s 
11.695 5.337 13.000 0.0 16.0 -
1.216 
3.024 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
25/09/2015 
Fitch 
13.141 2.785 15.000 1.0 16.0 -
1.802 
6.476 0.000 13/11/1995 
to 
17/12/2012 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
S&P 
17.662 2.680 18.000 11.0 20.0 -
1.616 
4.228 0.000 31/12/1992 
to 
02/10/2015 
Moody’
s 
17.66
4 
2.90
0 
18.000 11.
0 
20.
0 
-
1.362 
3.497 0.000 31/12/199
2 to 
9/02/2016 
Fitch 
18.96
2 
1.02
4 
19.000 12.
0 
20.
0 
-
1.219 
5.837 0.000 10/08/199
4 to 
07/06/201
2 
Note: Jarque-Bera p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis of normality. 
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Table 3. Linear Granger Causality Test. 
Country Rating F-stat p-value 
Brazil 
S&P 1.821 0.177 
Moody’s 3.195 0.074 
Fitch 0.215 0.643 
Russia 
S&P 0.397 0.529 
Moody’s 0.187 0.666 
Fitch 0.254 0.614 
India 
S&P 0.524 0.469 
Moody’s 0.171 0.679 
Fitch 0.401 0.526 
China 
S&P 0.626 0.429 
Moody’s 0.789 0.374 
Fitch 0.070 0.792 
South Africa 
S&P 0.380 0.538 
Moody’s 0.956 0.328 
Fitch 1.331 0.249 
Portugal 
S&P 2.141 0.144 
Moody’s 0.207 0.650 
Fitch 2.313 0.128 
Italy 
S&P 0.302 0.582 
Moody’s 1.146 0.285 
Fitch 1.015 0.314 
Ireland 
S&P 3.097 0.079 
Moody’s 2.168 0.141 
Fitch 0.495 0.482 
Greece 
S&P 4.875 0.027 
Moody’s 2.665 0.103 
Fitch 5.880 0.015 
Spain 
S&P 0.013 0.910 
Moody’s 0.206 0.650 
Fitch 0.363 0.547 
Note: * indicates rejection of the null that credit ratings does not 
Granger cause stock returns at 5 percent level of significance. 
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Table 4. BDS test of nonlinearity. 
Country Rating Dimension 
2 3 4 5 6 
Brazil 
S&P 15.705*** 19.967*** 23.870*** 26.669*** 29.355*** 
Moody’s 16.385*** 21.521*** 25.512*** 28.449*** 31.530*** 
Fitch 15.964*** 19.784*** 23.291*** 25.827*** 28.246*** 
Russia 
S&P 21.858*** 27.043*** 30.801*** 33.984*** 37.791*** 
Moody’s 20.150*** 25.358*** 29.029*** 32.278*** 35.898*** 
Fitch 19.337*** 24.352*** 27.891*** 31.108*** 34.907*** 
India 
S&P 16.441*** 20.557*** 23.623*** 26.238*** 29.054*** 
Moody’s 16.590*** 20.820*** 23.957*** 26.563*** 29.427*** 
Fitch 14.502*** 18.125*** 21.123*** 23.798*** 26.524*** 
China 
S&P 17.746*** 22.247*** 26.084*** 29.664*** 33.068*** 
Moody’s 17.786*** 22.201*** 26.131*** 29.702*** 33.095*** 
Fitch 13.240*** 16.962*** 20.350*** 23.557*** 26.576*** 
South Africa 
S&P 15.165*** 20.948*** 24.334*** 27.464*** 30.165*** 
Moody’s 15.209*** 21.332*** 24.881*** 28.183*** 30.977*** 
Fitch 15.338*** 21.631*** 25.573*** 29.047*** 32.006*** 
Portugal 
S&P 18.618*** 23.247*** 26.574*** 29.070*** 31.764*** 
Moody’s 18.412*** 22.994*** 26.197*** 28.545*** 30.980*** 
Fitch 17.065*** 21.834*** 25.359*** 28.011*** 30.401*** 
Italy 
S&P 14.248*** 19.819*** 23.614*** 26.947*** 30.003*** 
Moody’s 14.139*** 19.806*** 23.727*** 27.108*** 30.259*** 
Fitch 15.093*** 21.288*** 25.538*** 29.206*** 32.693*** 
Ireland 
S&P 20.699*** 27.203*** 30.935*** 34.093*** 36.960*** 
Moody’s 20.747*** 27.214*** 30.868*** 33.980*** 36.766*** 
Fitch 20.168*** 27.132*** 31.200*** 34.820*** 38.076*** 
Greece 
S&P 20.499*** 26.619*** 30.737*** 34.438*** 38.439*** 
Moody’s 20.352*** 26.510*** 30.522*** 34.266*** 38.262*** 
Fitch 15.455*** 21.222*** 25.288*** 28.741*** 32.355*** 
Spain 
S&P 16.240*** 21.251*** 24.843*** 28.569*** 31.751*** 
Moody’s 16.223*** 21.369*** 24.988*** 28.697*** 31.934*** 
Fitch 15.690*** 21.025*** 24.824*** 28.646*** 31.925*** 
Note: The table provides the results of Brock et al., (1996, BDS) test of nonlinearity in the relationship between stock 
market returns and the credit ratings of the three agencies. m stands for the number of (embedded) dimensions which 
embed the time series into m-dimensional vectors, by taking each m successive points in the series. Value in cell represents 
BDS z-statistic; *** indicates rejection of i.i.d. residuals at 1 percent level of significance. 
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Table 5a: Quantile causality (Returns) 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.88 1.05 1.19 1.23 1.23 0.62 0.51 0.67 0.82 1.00 1.13 1.00 0.83 0.97 
Moody’s 1.30 1.51 1.37 1.22 1.35 1.45 1.42 1.47 0.92 0.88 1.13 1.72 2.05* 2.40* 2.24* 2.00* 1.91 
Fitch 1.17 1.23 0.91 1.01 1.06 0.89 0.75 0.50 0.28 0.35 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.87 0.89 0.98 1.16 
Russia 
S&P 4.83* 5.87* 6.49* 5.04* 4.09* 2.49* 1.53 0.69 0.33 0.54 1.47 2.68* 3.77* 4.99* 6.09* 8.97* 8.79* 
Moody’s 4.82* 5.32* 6.36* 5.13* 3.92* 2.28* 1.59 0.99 0.41 0.71 1.69 2.49* 3.83* 4.72* 5.79* 8.97* 7.64* 
Fitch 2.85* 3.72* 5.42* 4.70* 3.87* 2.84* 1.77 1.04 0.51 0.41 0.80 1.50 2.32* 3.25* 4.77* 7.94* 6.25* 
India 
S&P 3.86* 3.72* 4.23* 3.96* 4.30* 4.61* 4.83* 4.43* 4.58* 5.34* 6.08* 6.06* 5.45* 5.82* 5.59* 4.70* 3.94* 
Moody’s 2.53* 2.51* 2.93* 2.86* 3.26* 2.95* 2.91* 2.24* 1.90 3.21* 2.89* 3.08* 3.07* 3.36* 3.05* 4.03* 3.83* 
Fitch 3.47* 3.03* 2.56* 2.06* 2.03* 2.05* 1.88* 1.90 2.03* 1.94 1.75 1.49 2.11* 2.79* 3.04* 3.17* 3.19* 
China 
S&P 1.06 1.33 1.51 0.80 0.69 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.57 0.71 0.94 1.12 1.31 1.58 1.70 2.11* 1.58 
Moody’s 1.03 1.26 1.50 0.88 0.76 0.90 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.81 1.02 1.18 1.26 1.59 1.65 2.03* 1.54 
Fitch 1.78 2.19* 1.77 1.37 0.88 0.67 0.47 0.44 0.30 0.38 0.77 1.36 1.70 2.36* 3.04* 2.80* 1.85 
South 
Africa 
S&P 5.42* 6.75* 7.88* 5.88* 5.36* 4.38* 3.19* 2.76* 3.49* 4.03* 5.05* 6.31* 6.76* 7.99* 7.14* 6.44* 4.74* 
Moody’s 5.56* 8.10* 10.3* 8.18* 8.17* 6.56* 5.16* 4.52* 5.51* 7.24* 8.41* 10.2* 9.71* 11.0* 8.95* 7.75* 5.02* 
Fitch 6.15* 9.52* 10.6* 8.25* 7.35* 5.65* 4.31* 3.65* 4.61* 6.39* 8.33* 10.8* 11.8* 13.3* 10.8* 9.59* 6.44* 
Portugal 
 
S&P 6.97* 9.86* 9.98* 10.6* 10.3* 8.30* 6.47* 5.26* 2.80* 2.75* 3.39* 4.86* 5.82* 7.57* 8.24* 6.53* 5.68* 
Moody’s 5.50* 6.76* 6.57* 6.89* 6.57* 5.77* 4.88* 4.21* 2.76* 2.99* 3.97* 4.56* 4.55* 4.86* 5.03* 4.21* 4.16* 
Fitch 4.91* 6.13* 5.32* 5.46* 4.85* 4.74* 3.93* 3.30* 2.19* 2.42* 3.26* 3.42* 3.33* 3.44* 3.55* 3.12* 2.94* 
Italy 
 
S&P 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.07 
Moody’s 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.07 
Fitch 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ireland 
 
S&P 4.77* 4.63* 5.72* 5.09* 4.73* 4.65* 4.05* 4.48* 3.61* 3.84* 4.02* 4.11* 4.35* 4.07* 4.20* 4.41* 3.71* 
Moody’s 4.10* 4.10* 4.75* 4.27* 3.17* 3.40* 2.67* 3.03* 2.37* 2.52* 2.42* 2.80* 3.14* 3.62* 3.91* 4.30* 3.84* 
Fitch 4.86* 5.19* 5.58* 4.87* 3.66* 3.39* 2.33* 2.92* 2.43* 2.36* 2.39* 2.87* 3.38* 3.89* 4.24* 5.13* 3.92* 
Greece 
 
S&P 9.15* 11.6* 11.3* 9.62* 7.26* 6.31* 4.82* 4.26* 4.85* 5.88* 5.72* 5.44* 5.41* 6.45* 6.76* 6.83* 6.90* 
Moody’s 6.73* 8.76* 9.17* 8.18* 6.67* 6.27* 5.15* 4.48* 4.97* 4.95* 4.67* 5.12* 5.66* 6.38* 6.70* 7.22* 6.39* 
Fitch 2.32* 2.23* 2.38* 1.64 1.12 0.86 0.65 0.45 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.63 0.95 1.09 1.34 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moody’s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fitch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
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Table 5b: Quantile causality (Volatility) 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Moody’s 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.43 0.52 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.36 0.25 0.21 0.13 
Fitch 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 
Russia 
S&P 0.56 1.28 2.38* 4.77* 5.98* 8.71* 11.2* 11.8* 14.1* 14.5* 14.9* 16.3* 17.9* 19.1* 16.1* 13.8* 8.23* 
Moody’s 3.16* 3.28* 5.12* 7.41* 8.39* 11.6* 14.2* 15.8* 18.4* 18.9* 20.6* 20.5* 22.3* 21.1* 17.0* 14.8* 10.8* 
Fitch 2.03* 2.16* 3.40* 5.29* 5.90* 7.03* 9.91* 11.7* 12.4* 12.5* 13.6* 13.8* 15.7* 15.1* 13.1* 12.0* 7.91* 
India 
S&P 1.85 2.99* 3.45* 4.69* 3.63* 3.18* 3.90* 4.71* 4.16* 4.15* 3.30* 3.86* 4.32* 3.54* 3.80* 3.89* 2.82* 
Moody’s 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.94 1.35 1.72 1.85 1.48 1.08 1.23 1.16 1.31 1.31 1.34 0.97 0.81 
Fitch 0.17 0.18 0.33 0.59 0.82 1.45 2.26* 2.50* 2.98* 5.32* 4.87* 6.23* 6.39* 6.74* 8.32* 6.99* 5.85* 
China 
S&P 1.07 1.29 1.47 2.17* 3.22* 3.59* 5.38* 6.63* 6.19* 7.08* 10.1* 9.42* 7.44* 6.63* 6.08* 6.16* 5.00* 
Moody’s 1.32 1.47 1.52 1.86 2.79* 3.19* 3.92* 4.83* 4.53* 5.46* 7.83* 7.81* 6.90* 6.08* 5.58* 5.30* 4.09* 
Fitch 0.78 0.82 1.48 1.87 3.19* 3.58* 4.88* 5.29* 5.75* 7.34* 8.35* 8.11* 7.71* 6.72* 6.41* 3.79* 2.24* 
South 
Africa 
S&P 2.73* 4.73* 7.99* 9.73* 12.1* 15.5* 17.7* 18.1* 21.6* 21.0* 22.0* 21.4* 23.4* 21.6* 16.3* 14.3* 11.8* 
Moody’s 4.27* 6.43* 9.94* 13.0* 15.0* 17.4* 20.0* 17.6* 21.0 17.4* 17.9* 16.0* 16.3* 13.2* 9.77* 7.06* 4.97* 
Fitch 4.38* 6.99* 11.9* 15.0* 17.2* 20.6* 22.2* 22.5* 25.8* 22.7* 21.6* 21.0* 22.6* 19.1* 14.1* 10.8* 8.23* 
Portugal 
 
S&P 4.70* 7.54* 9.55* 11.6* 16.1* 18.1* 17.8* 18.0 19.0* 19.9* 17.5* 13.8* 13.2* 11.3* 10.1* 8.05* 5.67* 
Moody’s 2.68* 3.64* 5.05* 6.76* 9.04* 8.71* 8.49* 9.38* 9.27* 8.80* 7.95* 6.89* 7.59* 6.68* 5.79* 5.10* 3.88* 
Fitch 2.90* 3.21* 4.58* 5.86* 6.82* 7.02* 6.25* 6.53* 6.25* 5.50* 5.23* 5.06* 5.57* 5.47* 4.39* 3.89* 2.72* 
Italy 
 
S&P 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.07 
Moody’s 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Fitch 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.49 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.26 
Ireland 
 
S&P 1.90 3.19* 4.18* 5.24* 6.07* 6.17* 6.08* 6.41* 6.77* 5.77* 5.25* 6.30* 7.06* 6.31* 6.58* 4.94* 3.17* 
Moody’s 1.67 2.40* 3.80* 5.56* 6.03* 6.20* 5.86* 6.95* 7.22* 6.61* 5.80* 6.30* 6.19* 5.03* 5.37* 4.60* 3.22* 
Fitch 1.51 2.74* 3.63* 4.95* 5.84* 6.30* 5.75* 7.04* 7.80* 7.47* 6.41* 7.79* 7.48* 6.61* 7.34* 5.91* 4.03* 
Greece 
 
S&P 0.54 1.00 1.39 2.21* 2.80* 3.79* 5.36* 7.65* 8.86* 10.2* 12.7* 15.5* 14.7* 17.9* 16.5* 15.1* 10.2* 
Moody’s 0.33 0.57 1.10 1.90 2.36* 3.18* 4.42* 6.60* 7.72* 8.86* 10.9* 13.0* 11.6* 13.8* 14.2* 12.1* 8.24* 
Fitch 1.00 1.55 1.61 2.64* 2.88* 3.70* 4.77* 5.21* 6.19* 7.55* 8.40* 8.58* 8.03* 7.69* 8.13* 6.49* 5.76* 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.92 1.04 1.79 2.82* 3.26* 4.53* 5.64* 6.09* 7.12* 6.87* 8.50* 8.09* 7.30* 6.81* 5.22* 4.52* 3.01* 
Moody’s 0.21 0.20 0.67 1.44 1.05 1.06 0.94 1.43 2.02* 2.55* 3.56* 4.36* 3.50* 2.74* 2.50* 3.12* 2.45* 
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Fitch 0.93 1.14 1.50 3.20* 4.89* 6.65* 7.72* 9.46* 12.2* 13.6* 16.8* 15.9* 12.3* 10.9* 9.49* 8.89* 6.64* 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
  
Table 6a: Quantile causality (Returns) under ratings upgrade 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 1.19 1.83 1.95 2.19 1.65 1.46 1.00 0.60 0.24 0.18 0.48 0.69 0.97 1.35 1.26 1.39 1.61 
Moody’s 2.00* 2.54* 2.08* 1.85 1.43 1.23 0.88 0.81 0.53 0.77 1.22 2.05* 3.23* 3.92* 3.87* 3.73* 3.86* 
Fitch 1.13 1.06 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.68 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.56 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.79 0.81 1.01 
Russia 
S&P 2.71* 3.29* 3.57* 4.28* 4.73* 3.38* 2.86* 1.98* 1.73 1.81 0.89 0.72 1.24 2.00* 2.49* 3.56* 4.67* 
Moody’s 6.65* 9.65* 11.0* 8.97* 7.72* 4.29* 2.87* 1.62 0.69 0.51 0.99 2.43* 4.04* 5.79* 6.91* 10.4* 8.72* 
Fitch 4.07* 3.77* 4.17* 4.37* 4.65* 2.77* 1.78 1.00 0.47 0.41 0.73 2.15* 3.32* 4.44* 5.53* 6.07* 7.62* 
India 
S&P 3.36* 2.75* 2.55* 2.33* 3.33* 3.88* 4.43* 3.64* 3.63* 5.92* 6.21* 6.19* 5.70* 6.58* 5.69* 5.40* 4.46* 
Moody’s 2.89* 2.72* 3.16* 3.08* 3.55* 3.21* 3.10* 2.40* 1.85* 3.41* 2.96* 3.02* 2.94* 3.29* 2.98* 4.03* 4.05* 
Fitch 2.05* 2.13* 1.86 1.53 1.63 1.37 1.51 1.27 1.42 1.82 1.66 1.76 2.49* 2.86* 2.80* 2.87* 2.57* 
China 
S&P 1.62 2.02* 2.12* 0.89 0.72 0.62 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.48 0.72 0.96 1.22 1.41 1.46 1.95 1.57 
Moody’s 1.03 1.11 0.98 0.67 0.45 0.38 0.28 0.17 0.23 0.46 0.92 1.20 0.93 1.14 1.15 1.61 1.35 
Fitch 1.07 1.28 0.90 0.59 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.33 0.46 0.93 1.40 1.59 1.88 2.47* 2.34* 1.57 
South 
Africa 
S&P 6.20* 7.65* 8.89* 6.37* 5.83* 4.58* 3.32* 2.50* 2.66* 3.66* 4.70* 6.75* 6.87* 8.84* 8.29* 7.29* 5.32* 
Moody’s 5.43* 7.48* 8.67* 6.39* 5.46* 5.26* 4.06* 3.88* 5.62* 8.19* 9.79* 12.4* 10.5* 12.8* 11.2* 9.11* 5.48* 
Fitch 4.69* 7.37* 8.40* 6.58* 6.07* 4.53* 3.47* 3.43* 4.18* 5.98* 7.81* 9.97* 10.4* 11.4* 8.67* 7.53* 4.85* 
Portugal 
 
S&P 6.25* 8.33* 7.00* 6.06* 6.36* 5.80* 4.70* 4.04* 2.61* 2.98* 3.97* 4.87* 5.36* 6.56* 7.66* 6.59* 5.55* 
Moody’s 4.36* 5.16* 5.04* 4.80* 5.00* 4.37* 3.70* 3.45* 2.23* 2.60* 3.68* 4.11* 3.99* 3.72* 4.34* 3.59* 3.39* 
Fitch 4.17* 5.37* 4.58* 4.96* 4.44* 4.47* 3.79* 3.22* 2.07* 2.26* 3.10* 3.18* 3.15* 3.27* 3.57* 3.00* 2.84* 
Italy 
 
S&P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Moody’s 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.25 0.17 0.10 
Fitch 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ireland 
 
S&P 5.11* 4.90* 5.90* 5.35* 4.26* 4.10* 3.31* 3.65* 3.15* 3.59* 3.48* 3.53* 3.77* 3.95* 4.47* 5.83* 5.39* 
Moody’s 5.00* 4.95* 5.51* 4.89* 3.62* 3.62* 2.72* 3.06* 2.41* 2.54* 2.35* 2.58* 3.09* 3.95* 4.56* 5.82* 5.38* 
Fitch 3.70* 3.56* 4.00* 3.61* 2.78* 2.56* 1.86 2.57* 2.22* 1.96* 1.91 2.33* 2.37* 2.49* 2.76* 3.35* 2.63* 
Greece 
 
S&P 6.25* 7.78* 7.60* 6.37* 5.00* 4.60* 3.72* 3.54* 3.85* 5.00* 5.01* 4.42* 4.45* 5.18* 5.27* 5.40* 5.39* 
Moody’s 4.99* 6.55* 7.12* 6.44* 5.13* 5.20* 4.19* 3.79* 4.04* 4.02* 4.18* 4.09* 4.02* 4.84* 4.81* 5.44* 4.92* 
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Fitch 1.03 0.78 0.64 0.41 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.43 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moody’s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fitch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 6b: Quantile causality (Volatility) under ratings upgrade 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.04 
Moody’s 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.42 0.53 0.66 0.75 0.87 0.69 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.68 0.54 0.32 
Fitch 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Russia 
S&P 0.12 0.30 1.35 1.83 2.75* 4.75* 5.41* 6.34* 6.34* 7.24* 8.35* 8.84* 9.55* 10.5* 11.2* 8.85* 5.91* 
Moody’s 2.83* 3.04* 4.99* 7.41* 9.17* 13.6* 16.6* 18.3* 21.9* 22.1* 24.6* 24.1* 25.6* 23.7* 18.8* 17.4* 11.9* 
Fitch 1.90 1.93 3.32* 4.58* 5.59* 6.63* 8.02* 9.34* 9.07* 9.29* 10.4* 10.6* 11.2* 11.2* 10.3* 9.23* 5.88* 
India 
S&P 0.89 1.69 1.99* 2.10* 1.66 1.76 1.94 2.18* 1.91 2.63* 2.34* 2.73* 3.20* 2.81* 3.13* 3.32* 2.58* 
Moody’s 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.94 1.35 1.72 1.85 1.48 1.08 1.23 1.16 1.31 1.31 1.34 0.97 0.81 
Fitch 0.11 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.56 1.39 1.62 1.60 1.70 3.23* 2.85* 3.62* 3.57* 3.58* 4.70* 4.05* 3.18* 
China 
S&P 1.08 1.29 1.47 2.17* 3.22* 3.59* 5.38* 6.63* 6.19* 7.08* 10.1* 9.42* 7.44* 6.63* 6.08* 6.16* 5.00* 
Moody’s 1.11 0.86 0.67 0.50 0.90 1.14 0.71 0.75 0.69 0.58 0.99 0.89 0.81 0.68 0.48 0.54 0.39 
Fitch 0.74 0.53 0.91 1.16 2.00* 2.18* 3.31* 3.76* 3.75* 5.21* 6.10* 6.32* 6.30* 5.57* 5.19* 3.02* 1.60 
South 
Africa 
S&P 2.25* 4.00* 7.69* 9.11* 11.1* 15.0* 16.5* 17.2* 21.8* 22.1* 23.1* 22.9* 24.7* 23.1* 17.8* 15.6* 12.5* 
Moody’s 2.76* 4.42* 7.93* 10.5* 12.4* 16.5* 17.0* 14.7* 19.7* 17.4* 17.6* 17.1* 17.2* 14.3* 11.7* 9.23* 7.22* 
Fitch 4.38* 6.99* 11.7* 15.0* 17.2* 20.6* 22.2* 22.5* 25.8* 22.7* 21.6* 21.0* 22.6* 19.1* 14.1* 10.8* 8.23* 
Portugal 
 
S&P 3.55* 4.49* 6.00* 7.98* 11.0* 9.94* 9.10* 9.93* 10.9* 10.9* 10.5* 8.86* 8.87* 8.27* 7.18* 6.43* 4.91* 
Moody’s 2.24* 2.68* 3.46* 4.49* 5.68* 4.80* 4.45* 5.28* 4.38* 3.74* 3.40* 3.34* 3.27* 2.86* 2.72* 2.82* 1.96* 
Fitch 2.64* 2.81* 3.99* 5.26* 6.01* 5.94* 5.06* 5.52* 5.57* 4.57* 4.18* 4.17* 4.44* 4.11* 3.24* 2.91* 1.86 
Italy 
 
S&P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Moody’s 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Fitch 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.51 0.44 0.24 
Ireland 
 
S&P 1.72 3.11* 4.22* 5.40* 6.28* 6.30* 6.43* 7.19* 7.89* 7.55* 7.21* 9.28* 10.6* 10.6* 10.4* 8.14* 5.81* 
Moody’s 1.67 2.74* 4.24* 6.27* 6.82* 6.95* 6.61* 7.93* 8.73* 8.76* 7.88* 9.14* 9.62* 9.17* 9.03* 7.52* 5.35* 
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Fitch 0.95 1.71 2.21* 3.12* 3.42* 3.79* 2.89* 3.51* 3.42* 2.55* 1.82 2.24* 2.18* 1.43 2.23* 1.86 1.25 
Greece 
 
S&P 0.57 1.32 1.98* 2.65* 3.35* 4.26* 5.49* 7.47* 9.10* 11.1* 12.8* 16.5* 17.5* 20.2* 17.4* 15.3* 10.5* 
Moody’s 0.21 0.25 0.41 0.48 0.65 0.86 1.01 1.39 1.97* 2.47* 3.25* 5.17* 5.17* 6.24* 6.28* 5.94* 4.86* 
Fitch 0.92 1.43 1.18 2.05* 1.95 2.73* 3.30* 3.41* 3.62* 4.09* 4.08* 4.27* 4.32* 4.08* 3.96* 3.14* 2.68* 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.34 0.50 0.95 1.64 1.54 2.20* 2.77* 3.58* 4.12* 3.89* 4.15* 4.67* 4.79* 4.45* 3.69* 3.05* 2.73* 
Moody’s 0.17 0.16 0.73 1.60 1.08 1.31 1.30 1.94 2.52* 2.52* 2.80* 2.80* 2.26* 2.02* 1.51 1.42 1.62 
Fitch 0.67 0.51 0.67 1.34 1.69 2.03* 1.93 2.38* 3.34* 4.07* 5.31* 5.48* 4.42* 3.23* 2.28* 1.70 1.36 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
  
Jo
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
oo
f
 31 
 
Table 7a: Quantile causality (Returns) under ratings downgrade 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 1.21 1.81 1.74 1.96 1.63 1.63 1.16 0.65 0.21 0.22 0.55 0.75 0.89 1.08 1.05 1.16 1.29 
Moody’s 1.46 1.76 1.52 1.42 1.28 0.98 0.76 0.46 0.20 0.33 0.59 0.92 1.46 1.75 1.59 1.40 1.55 
Fitch 0.96 0.94 0.81 1.15 1.02 0.95 0.53 0.43 0.18 0.22 0.36 0.55 0.87 1.31 1.16 1.31 1.60 
Russia 
S&P 1.35 1.43 1.29 0.95 1.47 1.43 1.50 1.14 1.17 2.34* 2.70* 2.28* 2.23* 2.34* 2.29* 3.23* 2.25* 
Moody’s 3.90* 6.14* 6.87* 6.03* 5.85* 3.62* 2.38* 1.28 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.76 1.39 2.25* 3.39* 5.06* 5.06* 
Fitch 1.61 1.51 1.42 1.58 2.07* 1.31 0.92 0.50 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.75 1.25 1.54 1.94 2.16* 2.75* 
India 
S&P 2.62* 2.68* 3.20* 2.97* 3.66* 3.11* 3.35* 2.08* 2.36* 3.41* 3.57* 3.60* 3.39* 3.88* 3.21* 3.63* 3.04* 
Moody’s 3.54* 3.36* 3.85* 4.04* 4.55* 4.01* 3.66* 2.47* 1.80 3.23* 2.63* 2.82* 2.71* 3.23* 3.05* 4.01* 3.62* 
Fitch 2.16* 2.47* 2.18* 1.64 1.58 1.27 1.28 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.87 1.61 2.13* 2.20* 2.38* 2.25* 
China 
S&P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Moody’s 1.01 1.17 1.27 0.77 0.58 0.62 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.69 0.95 1.11 1.11 1.39 1.47 1.91 1.45 
Fitch - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
South 
Africa 
S&P 3.28* 3.56* 5.13* 4.14* 3.78* 3.48* 2.73* 2.10* 1.48 1.85 1.95 2.11* 2.75* 3.32* 3.07* 2.04* 2.29* 
Moody’s 3.49* 3.96* 5.55* 4.25* 4.16* 3.46* 2.62* 1.98* 1.29 1.70 1.77 2.06* 2.78* 3.41* 3.13* 2.48* 2.38* 
Fitch - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Portugal 
 
S&P 6.63* 9.34* 8.20* 7.04* 6.50* 5.78* 4.61* 3.92* 2.46* 2.78* 3.52* 4.83* 5.23* 6.90* 8.44* 7.23* 6.18* 
Moody’s 6.57* 7.81* 7.63* 7.31* 6.33* 5.77* 4.46* 4.19* 2.21* 2.53* 3.22* 4.25* 4.47* 5.15* 6.46* 5.19* 4.86* 
Fitch 5.88* 7.25* 6.49* 6.16* 4.90* 4.70* 3.92* 3.31* 1.64 1.99* 2.60* 3.27* 3.46* 3.98* 4.74* 4.05* 3.87* 
Italy 
 
S&P 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.07 
Moody’s 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.08 
Fitch 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ireland 
 
S&P 6.82* 6.54* 6.48* 5.24* 4.31* 3.36* 2.48* 2.97* 2.34* 2.01* 2.29* 2.57* 3.11* 4.65* 5.28* 6.51* 5.94* 
Moody’s 6.83* 5.85* 5.93* 4.96* 4.09* 3.31* 2.37* 2.70* 2.29* 1.88 2.38* 2.63* 2.85* 4.14* 4.80* 5.96* 5.53* 
Fitch 6.62* 7.05* 6.57* 5.57* 4.37* 3.69* 2.47* 2.98* 2.28* 1.87 1.93 2.22* 2.84* 4.09* 5.20* 6.82* 5.52* 
Greece 
 
S&P 6.53* 7.90* 8.08* 6.77* 5.34* 4.38* 3.48* 2.64* 2.14* 2.81* 2.84* 3.22* 3.04* 4.56* 5.40* 6.10* 6.41* 
Moody’s 3.96* 4.68* 5.04* 4.68* 3.85* 3.63* 3.34* 3.10* 3.22* 3.47* 3.17* 3.50* 3.34* 3.85* 3.90* 4.18* 4.11* 
Fitch 0.84 0.71 0.60 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.35 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moody’s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fitch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
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Table 7b: Quantile causality (Volatility) under ratings downgrade 
Country rating Quantile 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Brazil 
S&P 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.01 
Moody’s 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.02 
Fitch 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Russia 
S&P 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.90 1.38 1.86 2.55* 2.49* 3.84* 3.41* 3.07* 3.70* 4.24* 4.10* 2.66* 2.86* 2.21* 
Moody’s 4.18* 4.02* 6.14* 9.60* 11.2* 14.8* 18.0* 20.5* 24.0* 25.8* 28.8* 29.1* 32.0* 31.9* 26.7* 24.0* 17.8* 
Fitch 2.60* 2.94* 4.66* 7.22* 9.37* 10.3* 12.0* 14.9* 14.4* 14.6* 17.2* 17.2* 20.1* 22.0* 21.2* 20.2* 13.0* 
India 
S&P 1.27 1.83 1.55 2.23* 1.65 2.03* 2.89* 2.89* 2.13* 1.20 1.08 1.00 1.06 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.94 
Moody’s 0.89 1.17 0.91 1.53 1.19 1.90 2.43* 2.37* 1.76 1.39 1.32 1.23 1.41 1.16 1.39 1.06 0.71 
Fitch 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.31 0.53 0.94 1.06 1.07 1.71 2.44* 2.07* 2.73* 3.06* 3.71* 4.16* 3.09* 2.59* 
China 
S&P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Moody’s 1.32 1.47 1.52 1.86 2.79* 3.19* 3.92* 4.83* 4.53* 5.46* 7.83* 7.81* 6.90* 6.08* 5.58* 5.30* 4.09* 
Fitch - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
South 
Africa 
S&P 0.14 0.22 0.47 0.75 0.63 0.74 1.24 0.82 1.14 0.82 0.60 0.58 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.58 0.55 
Moody’s 0.45 0.80 1.35 1.71 2.43* 2.41* 3.15* 2.15* 2.73* 1.90 1.90 1.59 0.95 0.86 0.95 0.90 0.76 
Fitch - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Portugal 
 
S&P 3.81* 4.53* 5.65* 6.10* 9.86* 9.08* 8.02* 9.42* 12.1* 13.0* 12.5* 10.5* 10.8* 10.6* 9.6* 8.2* 6.3* 
Moody’s 2.86* 3.65* 4.86* 4.83* 6.83* 7.59* 6.19* 6.91* 7.79* 7.93* 7.04* 5.66* 6.11* 5.68* 5.34* 5.27* 2.94* 
Fitch 2.62* 3.23* 4.18* 3.68* 4.95* 5.86* 4.56* 4.56* 5.05* 5.16* 4.90* 4.17* 4.13* 4.44* 4.75* 4.27* 2.37 
Italy 
 
S&P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Moody’s 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Fitch 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.33 0.46 0.58 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.36 0.18 
Ireland 
 
S&P 0.75 1.56 1.51 1.20 1.35 1.53 1.76 2.55* 3.51* 3.82* 3.78* 4.42* 6.51* 6.80* 7.65* 7.62* 5.51* 
Moody’s 0.88 1.46 1.71 1.15 1.03 1.27 1.57 1.84 2.62* 3.12* 3.03* 3.36* 4.90* 4.91* 6.06* 6.45* 4.46* 
Fitch 1.16 2.11* 2.13* 1.52 1.58 1.86 2.23* 2.65* 3.63* 4.20* 4.39* 5.45* 6.10* 6.86* 8.06* 8.03* 5.85* 
Greece 
 
S&P 0.23 0.54 0.80 1.30 1.70 1.96* 1.98* 3.30* 4.10* 4.85* 4.90* 7.06* 7.25* 8.09* 8.51* 6.39* 4.80* 
Moody’s 0.12 0.73 0.85 2.65* 3.11* 3.59* 4.61* 4.62* 4.77* 4.54* 5.13* 4.44* 3.08* 3.07* 3.04* 2.08* 1.05 
Fitch 0.63 0.73 0.92 1.52 1.49 1.94 2.22* 3.01* 2.73* 3.44* 3.77* 4.22* 4.04* 4.26* 4.65* 4.44* 3.92* 
Spain 
 
S&P 0.34 0.54 0.65 1.10 1.51 2.66* 3.21* 4.87* 6.28* 7.47* 10.2* 12.9* 11.0* 10.8* 10.2* 10.7* 8.4* 
Moody’s 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.67 0.56 0.81 1.01 1.78 2.35* 3.43* 5.12* 6.46* 5.25* 4.56* 4.20* 4.78* 4.22* 
Fitch 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.54 0.66 0.93 1.18 2.13* 3.11* 4.47* 6.72* 8.65* 6.90* 5.97* 5.87* 4.97* 4.28* 
Note: * indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no causality-in-quantiles at 5% level of significance. 
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Figure 1: Time series graphs of daily returns series. 
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Figure 2: Time series graphs of credit ratings by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
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